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Abstract
Organization have to deal with a plethora of IT security threats nowadays and to ensure smooth and
uninterrupted business operations, firms are challenged to predict the volume of IT security vulner-
abilities and to allocate resources for fixing them. This challenge requires decision makers to assess
which system or software packages are prone to vulnerabilities, what impact exploits might have, and
how many vulnerabilities can be expected to occur during a certain period of time. The academic
literature has increasingly drawn attention to the need for predicting IT security vulnerabilities.
However, only limited research has addressed the problem of forecasting IT security vulnerabilities
based on time series that deal with the specific properties of IT security vulnerabilities, i.e., rareness
of occurrence and high volatility. To address this shortcoming, we apply established methods which
are capable of forecasting events characterized by rareness of occurrence and high volatility. Based
on a dataset taken from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), we use the Mean Absolute
Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) to measure the forecasting accuracy of single,
double and triple exponential smoothing methodologies, Croston’s method, ARIMA, and a neural
network-based approach. We analyze the impact of the applied forecasting methodology on the
prediction accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of the examined system and
software packages ”operating systems”, ”browsers” and ”office solutions” and the applied metrics.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that analyzes the effect of prediction techniques
and applies forecasting metrics that are suitable in this context. Our results show that the optimal
forecasting methodology depends on the software or system package as some methods perform poorly
in the context of IT security vulnerabilities, that absolute metrics can cover the actual prediction
error precisely and that the prediction accuracy is robust within the two applied forecasting-error
metrics.
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1. Introduction
The impact of information technology (IT) security vulnerabilities can be substantial: In an
industry study, IBM estimates the reputation-related costs which result from software security
vulnerabilities leading to a disruption of business operations to range in the millions of dollars per
disruption (IBM Global Study, 2013). The economic consequences of breaches have been examined5
by FireEye, a network security company. Specifically, their data breach cost report for 2016 revealed
that 76 % of respondents would take their business away from a vendor that had demonstrated
negligent data handling practices (eWeek, 2016; FireEye, 2016). Similarly, the 2016 Cost of Data
Breach report by the Ponemon Institute and IBM Security showed that the average total cost of a
breach is US$4 million, an increase of 29% since 2013, with disruptions in daily operations being10
the most severe category of impact (Ponemon Institute, 2016). In the aftermath of a breach, firms
are challenged to mitigate the long-term financial impact by restoring customers’ trust. In essence,
these reports indicate that vulnerabilities pose permanent risks for firms for which they need to
be prepared to deal with. These risks are as diverse as they are plentiful, e.g., network attacks
(GhasemiGol et al., 2016), loss or theft of personal data, loss or theft of commercially sensitive15
information, inoperable IT systems (making the business unable to function after being hacked),
intellectual property infringement, and defamation or extortion, which can lead to serious financial
damage (ContractorUK, 2016).
These economic damages raise the general question of how to control the impact of such vulner-
abilities. In particular, this challenge requires decision makers to assess which system or software20
packages are prone to vulnerabilities, what impact exploits might have, and how many vulnerabil-
ities can be expected to occur during a certain period of time. The importance of this assessment
as an input for system and software acquisition, maintenance, and replacement is reinforced by a
recent study: Results from Veracode’s Bug Bounty survey of 500 IT decision makers working in
cybersecurity revealed that 83% of vendors have released code before testing or resolving security25
issues for bugs (Veracode, 2016; Software Testing NEWS, 2016).
Extant literature offers a plethora of managerial decisions which are contingent on accurate
predictions of vulnerabilities. For instance, the expected number of vulnerabilities can be used as
a measure of trustworthiness before a certain system or software package is acquired (Kim et al.,
2007) or discontinued. Furthermore, assessing the expected number of vulnerabilities can provide30
valuable input for allocating and prioritizing limited resources for inspecting, patching and testing
of an existing software portfolio (Kim et al., 2007; Shin et al., 2011; Walden et al., 2014). Plus,
predicting trends in the number of known vulnerabilities that could occur helps decision-makers
to take proactive actions to minimize the threats that vulnerabilities may pose (Venter and Eloff,
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2004).35
The overall impact of security vulnerabilities can be estimated based on the amount of the
potential collateral damage and the frequency of occurrences. Our study focuses on the research
challenge of predicting the number of security vulnerabilities in subsequent periods of time. To
reliably predict the number of vulnerabilities for a particular system or software package, forecasting
methods must account for three fundamental properties of security vulnerabilities (Gegick et al.,40
2009): First, vulnerabilities are rare events (Shin et al., 2011); to be specific, it is not uncommon
that there are several months in which no vulnerabilities are reported. Second, with respect to
those months where vulnerabilities are observed, there are a few periods where a comparatively
high number of vulnerabilities is reported. For instance, 19 vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-1126 to
CVE-2012-1144) were reported for the Firefox browser in April, 2012 (MITRE Corporation, 2017a),45
while there were none in May and June, 2014. And third, time series of vulnerabilities are not
necessarily stationary1, which means that they do not have the same expected value and the same
variance at each point in time. A reason for this is the development of software within the version
history. While some versions represent minor changes, other versions include substantial changes
in the software. For example, the completely overhauled Firefox implemented in the new Quantum50
version represented major changes in performance and security. These include a stricter and more
confined framework for extensions and additional sandboxing (Mozilla, 2017). In our study, we
therefore take into account different versions of each package and examine them separately.
The academic literature dealt with the study of IT security vulnerabilities using regression tech-
niques for prediction (Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011;55
Zhang et al., 2011; Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014), machine learning techniques
(Neuhaus et al., 2007; Gegick et al., 2009; Nguyen and Tran, 2010; Scandariato et al., 2014), statis-
tical analyses with the help of reliability growth models and vulnerability discovery models (Ozment,
2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011) and time series analysis (Roumani et al., 2015; Last,
2016). While an evaluation of these methods shows sound performance values, we observe that none60
of these approaches considered methods which account for the unique rareness of occurrence and
high volatility of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, only two recent studies (Roumani et al., 2015; Last,
2016) focus the prediction from a time series perspective. While Roumani et al. (2015) uses ARIMA
and exponential smoothing for the prediction of security vulnerabilities, Last (2016) analyzed the
forecast of vulnerabilities from different browsers, operating systems, and video players using both65
regression models (Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques. Both stud-
ies show an acceptable fit and can be helpful to predict vulnerabilities. However, the techniques
1”A time series is stationary if its statistical properties (mean, variance and autocorrelation) are held constant
over time” (Ferreiro, 1987, p. 65).
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applied in these studies are not appropriate for the specific properties of security vulnerabilities
discussed before (rareness of occurrence and high vulnerability). There can be methods used and
evaluated, in particular Croston’s method which is designed for time series with a lot of null zero70
values 2. Consequently, this implies that the prediction accuracy can differ due to the characteristics
of the forecasting methodology.
Furthermore, the particular system or software package under consideration needs attention as
different packages have different release cycles and different number of vulnerabilities that is not
taken into account when they are not grouped together. It is necessary to differentiate between75
different versions due to changes within the development history. We therefore argue that the
prediction accuracy depends on the system or software packages. For instance, the number of
vulnerabilities is related to the market share and the maturity stage of the product: Alhazmi et al.
(2007) for example points out that if a system or software starts to attract attention and users
start switching to it, the number of vulnerabilities will increase. Another example is the degree of80
maturity. A system or software is likely to have more vulnerabilities in their early stages rather
than a mature one which has been used and tested for years.
Finally, the usage of suitable accuracy metrics is also a crucial point when examining the forecast
quality. The academic literature provides a lot of accuracy metrics (cf. the literature reviews on
accuracy metrics Hyndman and Koehler (2006); Hyndman et al. (2006); Willemain et al. (2004);85
Willmott et al. (1985)), however not all are suitable when the time series are zero-inflated. For
example, prediction accuracy metrics which compute the percentage error of the forecast and actual
vulnerabilities are not adaptable by definition. These metrics produce infinite / undefined values
when there are no actual vulnerabilities reported for a time t.
The aforementioned arguments concerning the methodology, object and metrics of vulnerability90
prediction result in the research question
”How accurately can different forecasting methodologies predict IT security vulnerabilities?”,
where we analyze the accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of examined
system and software packages and applied metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first that analyzes the effect of forecasting methodologies which take into account the uniqueness95
and rareness of vulnerability time series and applies forecasting metrics that are suitable in this
context.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Next, we provide an overview of related
work. In Section 3, we explain our methodology and the data set. In Section 4, we present and
discuss the results of our empirical study. The paper closes with a summary.100
2In our study zero means that no IT security vulnerabilities are reported within the observed time horizon.
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2. Research Background
In this section, we give a short overview of related research by discussing and highlighting current
research streams of IT security vulnerabilities and their forecasting.
2.1. IT Security Vulnerabilities
Currently, there is no standardized definition of the term security vulnerability, and answering105
the question “what a security vulnerability is” remains a challenge (Microsoft Corporation 2015).
We adopt the terms “vulnerability” and “exposure” of the U.S. MITRE Corporation as “security
vulnerability” for two reasons: First, the “Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures” (CVE) entries
are not only used by many empirical papers (Singh et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; Younis et al.,
2016; Chatzipoulidis et al., 2015; Ozment, 2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011; Wang et al.,110
2008; Last, 2016) but also by information security product and service vendors (Schryen, 2011, 2009)
such as Adobe, Apple, IBM or Microsoft (MITRE Corporation, 2017b); and second, the definition
of vulnerabilities in the context of the CVE program covers weaknesses in the computational logic
found in software and hardware components that, when exploited, result in a negative impact on
confidentiality, integrity, or availability (MITRE Corporation, 2017c). Therefore, we adopt the CVE115
system’s definition of an information security vulnerability being “a mistake in software that can
be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or network” (MITRE Corporation, 2017c).
Accordingly, vulnerabilities allow attackers to successfully violate security policies, for example, by
executing commands as another user, by reading or changing data although such access should
be restricted, by posing as another entity, or by conducting a denial of service attack (MITRE120
Corporation, 2017c; Telang and Wattal, 2007).
A schematic classification of vulnerabilities is shown in the figure below:
Figure 1: Classification of Vulnerabilities (Schryen, 2011).
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Vulnerabilities can occur for several reasons, starting from programming errors, malicious soft-
ware engineers or unintentional behaviors (Schryen, 2011) and, even though firms strive to reduce
security vulnerabilities through technological attempts (Hinduja and Kooi, 2013), it remains a chal-125
lenging task to detect vulnerabilities. Furthermore, if a vulnerability is detected, an open question
is still whether to publish the vulnerability or not. While there are some critical voices to publish as
the probability of vulnerability rediscovery to be negligible (e.g., Rescorla (2005)), studies show that
vulnerabilities are correlated in terms of rediscovery, and therefore should be announced publicly
(Ozment, 2005). In this work, we focus on the published vulnerabilities in order to better forecast130
them in the future.
2.2. IT Security Vulnerability Forecasting
The following table illustrates the IT security vulnerability forecasting literature we could iden-
tify:
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Table 1: IT Security Vulnerability Prediction Models
Article Applications Used
Predictors
Prediction Technique Data Source
Regression Techniques
Shin and Williams (2008) JavaScript Engine of
Firefox
Code Complexity Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla
Chowdhury and
Zulkernine (2011)
Firefox Web Browser Complexity, Coupling
and Cohesion
Naive Bayes, Decision
Tree, Random Forest,
Logistic Regression
Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla
Shin et al. (2011) Firefox Web Browser,
Red Hat Linux Kernel
Complexity, Code Churn,
Developer Activity
Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla & National
Vulnerability Database &
Red Hat Security
Advisory
Smith and Williams
(2011)
WordPress, WikkaWikki SQL Hotspots Logistic Regression WordPress &
WikkaWikki
Vulnerability Reports
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Zhang et al. (2011) Adobe, Internet Explorer,
Linux, Apple, Windows
Period of Time between
Vulnerabilities
Linear & Regression
Models (Least Mean
Square & Multi-Layer
Perceptron & RBF
Network & SMO
Regression % Gaussian
Processes)
National Vulnerability
Database
Shin and Williams (2013) Firefox Web Browser Complexity, Code Churn,
Prior Faults
Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla
Walden et al. (2014) PHPMyAdmin, Moodle,
Drupal
Complexity, Source Code,
Vulnerability Locations
Random Forest National Vulnerability
Database, Project
Announcements
Machine Learning
Neuhaus et al. (2007) Mozilla Project Imports and Function
Calls
Support Vector Machine Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla
Gegick et al. (2009) Cisco Software System Non-Security Failures Classification and
Regression Tree Models
Cisco Fault-Tracking
Database
Nguyen and Tran (2010) JavaScript Engine of
Firefox
Component Dependency
Graphs
Bayesian Network, Naive
Bayes, Neural Networks,
Random Forest, Support
Vector Machine
Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories &
Bugzilla
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Scandariato et al. (2014) Android Applications Text Mining of Java Code Decision Trees, k-Nearest
Neighbor, Naive Bayes,
Random Forest, Support
Vector Machine
Source Code of Used
Applications with Fortify
Source Code Analyzer
Statistical Models
Ozment (2006) OpenBSD Number of Failure Data Reliability Growth
Models
OpenBSD Web Page,
ICAT, Bugtraq, OSVDB,
ISS X-Force
Ozment and Schechter
(2006)
OpenBSD Time between Failures Statistical Code Analysis,
Reliability Growth
Models
OpenBSD web page,
ICAT, Bugtraq, OSVDB,
ISS X-Force
Joh (2011) Windows XP, OS X 10.6,
IE 8, Safari
Number of Vulnerabilities Vulnerability Discovery
Models
NVD, Secunia, OSVDB
Time Series Analysis
Last (2016) Different Browsers,
Operating Systems,
Video Players
Number of Vulnerabilities Linear & Regression
Models (Linear,
Quadratic, and
Combined), Machine
Learning
National Vulnerability
Database
Roumani et al. (2015) Chrome, Firefox, Internet
Explorer, Safari, Opera
Number of Vulnerabilities ARIMA, Exponential
Smoothing
National Vulnerability
Database
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The above table shows that the extant literature mainly uses regression techniques for prediction135
(Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011;
Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014). For instance, Shin and Williams (2008) adopted code
complexity that differentiate vulnerable functions and investigated whether code complexity can be
useful for vulnerability detection. The results indicate that complexity can predict vulnerabilities
at a low false positive rate, but at a high false negative rate. In a similar work, Shin et al. (2011)140
examined if complexity, code churn, and developer activity can be used to distinguish vulnerable
from neutral files, and to forecast vulnerabilities. Shin and Williams (2013) showed that fault pre-
diction models and vulnerability prediction models provide good accuracy in forecasting vulnerable
code locations across a wide range of classification thresholds. Chowdhury and Zulkernine (2011)
developed an approach to automatically predict vulnerabilities based on historical data, complexity,145
coupling, and cohesion by using four alternative statistical and data mining techniques. The results
indicate that structural information from the non-security realm such as complexity, coupling, and
cohesion is useful in vulnerability prediction. In their study they were able to predict approximately
75 % of the vulnerable-prone files. Walden et al. (2014) compared the vulnerability prediction ef-
fectiveness based on complexity, source code, and vulnerability locations in the source code for the150
forecast of vulnerable files. They showed that text mining provides a high recall for PHPMyAdmin,
Moodle, and Drupal code analysis.
Besides approaches using mainly regression techniques, there are other used predictors and tech-
niques as well. For example, Smith and Williams (2011) analyzed whether SQL hotspots provide
a useful heuristic for the prediction of web application vulnerabilities. Their analysis reveals that155
the more SQL hotspots a file contains per line of code, the higher the probability that this file will
contain vulnerabilities. Neuhaus et al. (2007) introduced a support vector machine based tool that
achieved high accuracy in predicting vulnerable components in software code based on imports and
function calls. Furthermore, Gegick et al. (2009) created a classification and regression tree model
to determine the probability of a component having at least one vulnerability. The evaluation shows160
that non-security failures provide useful information as input variables for security-related predic-
tion models. Nguyen and Tran (2010) demonstrated that dependency graphs are another viable
option to predict vulnerable components and Scandariato et al. (2014) used the source code of An-
droid applications as input for text mining approaches, statistical methods and artificial intelligence
techniques to determine which components of a project are likely to contain vulnerabilities. After165
validating their approach by applying it to various Android applications, they determined that a
dependable prediction model can be built.
Statistical models were also used to examine vulnerability predictions. For instance, (Ozment,
2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006) used reliability growth models and statistical analyses showed
that these have acceptable one-step-ahead predictive accuracy for the set of independent data points.170
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Joh (2011) applied vulnerability discovery processes in major web servers and browsers: The analyses
show reasonable prediction capabilities for both time-based and effort-based models for datasets from
Web servers and browsers.
More recently, time series analysis has also been used to forecast the number of vulnerabil-
ities. For example, Roumani et al. (2015) considered time series models (ARIMA, exponential175
smoothing) for the prediction of security vulnerabilities. The results reveal that time series models
provide a good fit and can be helpful to predict vulnerabilities. Last (2016) analyzed the forecast of
vulnerabilities from different browsers, operating systems, and video players using both regression
models (Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques. The evaluation of
these methods indicates significant predictive performance in forecasting zero-day vulnerabilities.180
However, a more detailed analysis of these approaches uncovers three issues: 1) The literature on
predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities from a time series approach is rather sparse. 2)
Predictions on which software components are more likely to be vulnerable do not provide insights
into the volume of vulnerabilities that will occur. And 3), none of these research foci address the
uniqueness of vulnerabilities, namely, rareness of their occurrence and high volatility (as noted in185
Section 1). We therefore concentrate on predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities from a
time series perspective taking into account methods and accuracy metrics that are suitable for these
two properties inter alia. The next section explains the different methods and accuracy metrics we
used in this study.
3. Methodology and Data190
In this section, we motivate and outline the forecast methodologies implemented in our study
and introduce a consistent notation (Subsection 3.1), present accuracy metrics to compare the
different forecast approaches, which are suitable in the context of security vulnerability forecasting
(Subsection 3.2). Finally, we describe the data set in terms of analyzed software systems (Subsection
3.3).195
3.1. Forecasting Methodologies
In line with the study of Nikolopoulos et al. (2016), we implement a multiple forecasting approach,
where we compare several forecasting methods and evaluate their performance in terms of forecasting
accuracy.
We forecast time series of monthly security vulnerabilities using the forecasting horizons of one,200
two, and three months. We evaluate the results against a test set of held out security vulnerability
data. Time-series forecasting approaches are organized in five main research streams: (Exponential)
Smoothing methods, regression methods, (advanced) statistical models, neural networks and (other)
data mining algorithms (Wang et al., 2009). We refer to Chatfield (2000), who identifies key aspects
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which need to be considered when choosing a forecasting method. These include the properties of205
the time series being forecasted and the forecast accuracy of the method.
In our study, we use two types of forecasting methods. The first group of forecasting methods
we use are not in particular designed for the purpose of zero-inflated time series 3. Yet, these
methods are used both in practice and academic literature widely, and very recently for predicting
the number of IT security vulnerabilities (Roumani et al., 2015). These forecasting methods within210
this first group comprise single, double and triple exponential smoothing methods (SES, DES, and
TES) which are also referred to as single exponential, Holt’s linear trend method, and Holt-Winter’s
method. In addition, we implement an ARIMA based approach, which is an advanced statistical
model.
Regarding our context, time series of IT security vulnerabilities differ from conventional series215
in the respect that they have multiple periods of zero values. Forecasting methodologies that are
appropriate for zero-inflated time series are thus especially suitable in our context (Ogcu Kaya and
Demirel, 2015). Such time series with a lot of zero values are well-known in intermittent demand
analysis: Many scholars have recognized and contributed to the problems of predicting infrequent
and irregular demand patterns, i.e., the observed demand during many periods is zero, interspersed220
by occasional periods with irregular non-zero demand (Johnston and Boylan, 1996).
We therefore use a second group of forecasting methodologies that are designed for the purpose
of handling such time series. In particular we apply Croston’s method and a Neural Network
based approach. Croston (1972) highlighted the inadequacies of common methods for intermittent
demand forecasting and developed a method, which is one of the widely used forecasting methods for225
intermittent demand (Shenstone and Hyndman, 2005; Syntetos et al., 2015). From a methodological
point of view, it is built upon the estimation from the demand size and inter-arrival rate: The original
time series is decomposed into a time series without zero values and a second one that captures
durations of zero valued intervals (Herbst et al., 2014). In addition, we want to shed light on the
following methodological association with Croston’s method and SES: When data is aggregated, i.e.230
in our case if we had grouped the different versions together, the zero-inflation of the data would have
been decreased. In the academic literature, it is discussed that such an aggregation could lead to
time series containing no zero values for the higher aggregation levels (where the mean intermittent
demand interval will be equal to unity) (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). In this special case,
Croston’s method is equivalent to SES in the case where all periods have non-zero demands and235
the literature suggests to use SES instead (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). However, as we
separated different versions of software and system packages, this is not the case for our data.
3Zero-inflated time series are time series which contain a lot of zero values and show a high volatility when a value
occurs.
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Therefore, we include Croston’s method. Furthermore, the suitability of Croston’s method for such
time series has been empirically shown. It performs more effectively in forecasting zero-inflated and
intermittent demand time series data (e.g., Kourentzes (2013); Gutierrez et al. (2008)). For example240
Willemain et al. (1994) have demonstrated that Croston’s method gives superior forecasts to some
competing methods when predicting zero-inflated time series.
Besides Croston’s method, we use a Neural Network based approach that ”are used to provide
dynamic demand rate forecasts, which do not assume constant demand rate in the future and can
capture interactions between the non-zero demand and the inter-arrival rate of demand events”245
(Kourentzes, 2013, p. 198). Kourentzes (2013) have shown evidence for the applicability of neural
network approaches in predicting zero-inflated time series. Therefore, we include both Croston’s
method and artificial neural networks, which better address the specific characteristics of security
vulnerability time series data.
The predicted outcome variable yˆt+h|t, used throughout the paper, is defined as the forecasted250
value yˆ at time (t + h), where t is the starting time and h the proposed forecast horizon. In our
study we test three different forecasting horizons covering short (one month, h = 1), medium (two
months, h = 2), and long (three months, h = 3) time frames.
3.1.1. Exponential Smoothing Methods
Single Exponential Smoothing255
The idea behind SES is to weigh the most recent observations against the observations from the
more distant past using the parameter α. Forecasts are calculated using weighted averages where
the weights decrease exponentially as observations lie further in the past. In other words, smaller
weights are associated with older observations. SES only depends on the linear parameter lt, which
denotes the level of the series at time t. Due to this definition, SES predicts every value into the260
future with the same value, derived from the last observed level. Our outcome variable can in this
case be described as yˆt+1|t. For smaller values of α more weight is given to the observations from
the more distant past. The equation for single exponential smoothing is listed in the following:
yˆt+h|t = yˆt+1|t = lt (1)
lt = αyt + (1− α)lt−1
Double Exponential Smoothing
Single exponential smoothing can be extended to allow forecasting of data with a linear trend
which is called the double exponential smoothing method. This was done by Charles C. Holt in
1957. This method is slightly more complicated than the original one without trend. In order to
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add the trend component to the outcome variable yˆt+1|t the term bt, which denotes the slope of the
time series at time t:
yˆt+h|t = lt + hbt (2)
lt = αyt + (1− α)(lt−1 + bt−1)
bt = β(lt − lt−1) + (1− β)bt−1
While Parameter lt still denotes the level, bt represents the slope of the time series. The weight265
β is used to weigh the slope between the two most recent observations against the observations from
the more distant past using the parameter α.
Triple Exponential Smoothing
This approach is an extension of DES with added seasonality often referred as triple exponential
smoothing (TES). There are three components in this model (cf. Equation 3). As in the previous
model, the first denotes the level, while the second represents the trend component. In TES, the
third term st denotes the seasonality component. The outcome variable yˆt+1|t can thus be defined
as follows:
yˆt+h|t = lt + hbt + st+hm−m (3)
lt = α(yt − st−m) + (1− α)(lt−1 + bt−1)
bt = β(lt − lt−1) + (1− β)bt−1
st = γ(yt − lt−1 − bt−1) + (1− γ)st−m
Where hm = [(h− 1) mod m] + 1, which ensures that the estimates of the seasonal parameters
came from the correct season.270
While Parameter lt and bt are analogously defined to SES and DES, the weight γ is introduced
to weigh the seasonality component over the m most recent time periods.
3.1.2. ARIMA
In an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model, the future value of a variable
is assumed to be a linear function of several past observations and random errors. ARIMA models
combine differencing with auto-regression and a moving average model. We used the ARIMA(p, d, q)
model where p is the order of the autoregressive part, d is the degree of first differencing involved
and q is the order of the moving average part. The general equation of an ARIMA(p, d, q) model is
the following (Der Voort et al., 1996; Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2018):
yˆ′t+h|t = c+ Φ1y
′
t + Φ2y
′
t−1 + . . .+ Φpy
′
t−p + θ1et−1 + θ2et−2 + . . .+ θqet−q + et (4)
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where yt denotes the number of vulnerabilities at time t, yˆt+h|t is the forecast of the time series y. c is
a constant and Φp are the coefficients (to be determined by the model) of the autoregressive model.275
et is a zero mean white noise error factor and together with the coefficients θq forms the moving
average terms. Since stationarity is a requirement for ARIMA forecasting models and security
vulnerabilities have been found to be non-stationary (Arora et al., 2006, 2010), we appropriately
transformed the data using differentiation. With this, yˆ′t+h|t and y
′
t are the differenced series (degree
of differentiation depending on d).280
3.1.3. Croston’s Method
In order to account for the characteristic properties of security vulnerability time series data, we
choose Croston’s method as an additional forecasting method, specifically the bias-adjusted version
of Croston’s method developed by Syntetos and Boylan (1999). The method of Croston (1972)
separately forecasts the non-zero periods’ magnitudes and the inter-arrival time between successive
non-zero periods using SES. yˆt+h|t is then defined as forecasted mean of security vulnerabilities.
This method basically decomposes the intermittent vulnerabilities into two parts: the number of
non-zero vulnerabilities zˆt+h|t and the time interval between those vulnerability periods vˆt+h|t, and
then applies the single exponential smoothing on both parts. Croston’s method uses only one weight
parameter α, for both SES parts, therefore, yˆt+h|t, the estimate of mean non-zero vulnerabilities at
time t, is defined as follows:
yˆt+h|t =
zˆt+h|t
vˆt+h|t
(5)
zˆt+h|t =
zt if yt = 0αyt + (1− α)zt if yt 6= 0
vˆt+h|t =
vt if yt = 0αyt + (1− α)yˆt if yt 6= 0
Croston’s method is widely used in the intermittent demand forecasting and furthermore “the stan-
dard method to be used in the industry nowadays, being implemented in many ERP systems and
dedicated forecasting software” (Petropoulos et al., 2016).
3.1.4. Neural Network285
The last method, which makes use of neural networks (Nnet), is also particularly useful when
dealing with zero-inflated time series. It has been used extensively to predict lumpy and intermittent
demand and has shown good accuracy (Gutierrez et al., 2008; Kourentzes, 2013; Amin-Naseri and
Tabar, 2008). We applied a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer. While J
denotes the number of time series observations used as input pj for the neural network, the number290
of forecasted security vulnerabilities yˆt+h|t are defined as follows:
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yˆt+h|t = β0 +
I∑
i=1
βig
γ0j + J∑
j=1
γijpj
 (6)
where w = (β,γ) are the weights of the network with β = [β1, ..., βI ] and γ = [γ11, ..., γIJ ] for
the output and the hidden layers respectively. The β0 and γ0j are the biases of each neuron, which
function as the intercept in a regression for each neuron. I is the number of hidden nodes in the
network and g(·) is a non-linear transfer function, which is in our case the sigmoid logistic function295
and provides the nonlinear capabilities to the model.
3.2. Accuracy Metrics
The literature on accuracy metrics can be divided into four types of forecasting error metrics
(Hyndman et al., 2006): Absolute metrics such as the mean absolute error (MAE) or root mean
square error (RMSE), percentage-error metrics such as the mean absolute percent error (MAPE)300
or mean arctangent absolute percentage error (MAAPE), relative-error metrics, which average the
ratios of the errors from a designated method to the errors of a naive method (e.g., Median Relative
Absolute Error (MdRAE)) and scale-free error metrics, which express each error as a ratio to an
average error from a baseline method (Mean Absolute Scaled Error (MASE)).
From the above-mentioned accuracy metrics, percentage-error metrics, relative-error metrics305
and the mean absolute scaled error are not suitable for the following reasons: As we deal with zero-
inflated time series, percentage-error metrics such as the MAPE are not well-defined, i.e. MAPE
has the significant disadvantage that it produces infinite or undefined values for zero or close-to-zero
actual values (Kim and Kim, 2016). Other percentage-error metrics which were developed for zero-
inflated time series have some other drawbacks. For instance, although MAAPE is being designed310
for the purpose of intermittent demand forecasting (Kim and Kim, 2016), it lonely to interpret
the forecasting accuracy seems not to be sufficient due to its definition drawback: Regardless the
prediction, it maps every value to the worst value of pi2 when the actual value is zero (yt = 0).
Relative-error metrics have similar shortcomings because it would involve division by zero and
therefore not adaptable to zero-inflated time series as well (Hyndman et al., 2006). The fourth315
group of metrics, the mean absolute scaled error, is also not suitable in our context as we applied a
rolling origin forecasting evaluation. Due to this, it is not usable in our context as the denominator
becomes indefinite. To sum up, neither of these metrics is appropriate for zero-inflated time series
because zero observations may yield division by zero problems (Syntetos and Boylan, 2005).
Therefore and in line with other studies (e.g., Arora and Taylor (2016); Taylor and Snyder (2012);320
Zhao et al. (2014)), in this study we use absolute forecast accuracy metrics due to the following
reasons: First, both the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) can
reflect the prediction accuracy of zero-inflated time series. Second, both accuracy metrics are widely
16
used in the forecasting literature and third, as absolute error metrics are calculated as a function
of the forecast errors so that we can interpret the deviation in alignment with the structure of the325
time series. In the academic literature, a combination of metrics of MAE and RMSE is suggested
to assess the model performance (Chai and Draxler, 2014). In the next subsection, we explain the
MAE and the RMSE and in Subsection 3.2.3, we associate the accuracy metrics and time series
structure in order to interpret the MAE and RMSE values.
3.2.1. Accuracy Metric: Mean Absolute Error330
In order to capture the absolute forecasting error and to interpret our results, we assessed the
Mean Absolute Error (MAE). The MAE is one of the most commonly used metric for evaluating
the absolute error defined as the average of the absolute errors between the measured and predicted
values (Gospodinov et al., 2006):
MAE =
1
N
N∑
t=1
(|yt − yˆt|) . (7)
The MAE is a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as the data being335
measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). As our datasets contain only IT security vulnerabilities, we
can compare the absolute forecast errors between the different versions of software and system
application packages.
A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy: All predicted values are equal to the real values.
To give a sense for interpretability, we want to provide some examples for MAE as well with the340
same examples we used before for explaining MAE’s values.
Let us assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t
equals yt = 10. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals yˆt = 11.
As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 1, which is close to its
theoretical minimum of 0.345
Let us now assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period
t equals yt = 5. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals 100, i.e.
yˆt = 100. As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 95. However,
regarding MAE, the value of 95 is not enough to explain the interpretability of MAE solely which
we want to highlight with the following example: If the actually published security vulnerabilities350
during a period t had been yt = 10000 and the predicted vulnerabilities equaled 10095, the MAE still
would have been 95 but on a reasonable fit as we had only an overestimation of 0.95% while in the
first scenario we had an overestimation of 95%. These examples show that for the interpretability
of MAE, we have to associate the MAE value with the actual published security vulnerabilities as
MAE is a sum of error terms et : R≥0 → R≥0 for t ∈ N with et : (|yt − yˆt|).355
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3.2.2. Accuracy Metric: Root Mean Square Error
We further assessed the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) in order to capture the absolute
forecasting error and to interpret our results. The RSME is also one of the most commonly used
metric for evaluating the absolute error and is defined as
RMSE =
√∑N
t=1 (yt − yˆt)2
N
. (8)
The RMSE is similar to the MAE a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as360
the data being measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). However, they are more sensitive to outliers than
MAE by definition (Hyndman and Koehler, 2006).
A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy: All predicted values are equal to the real values.
To give a sense for interpretability, we want to provide some similar examples for RMSE.
Let us assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t365
equals yt = 10. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals yˆt = 11.
As we have only one observation, the value of RMSE would get a value of 1, which is close to its
theoretical minimum of 0.
Let us now assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period
t equals yt = 5. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals 100, i.e.370
yˆt = 100. As we have only one observation, the value of RMSE would get a value of 9025. This
simple example shows that such outliers have significant impacts on the RMSE’s value. However,
regarding RMSE, the value of 9025 is not enough to explain the interpretability of RMSE solely which
we want to highlight with the following example: If the actually published security vulnerabilities
during a period t had been very large such as yt = 1000000 and the predicted vulnerabilities equaled375
1000095, the RMSE still is 9025. However, comparing the RMSE of 9025 in the latter case, we have
a very low overestimation close to zero while in the first scenario, we have an overestimation of
95%. These examples reveal that to interpret RMSE, we have to associate its value with the actual
published security vulnerabilities as RMSE is a mapping of error terms et : R≥0 → R≥0 for t ∈ N
with et : (yt − yˆt)2.380
3.2.3. Accuracy Metrics and Time Series Structure
We explained in the Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 how MAE and RMSE is defined. Comparing
both metrics, MAE is less sensitive to extreme values than RMSE (Li and Heap, 2011; Willmott,
1982; Willemain et al., 2004). When the differences between the MAE and RMSE are close to each
other, it means that very large errors are unlikely to have occured (Li and Shi, 2010). The academic385
literature does not provide exact ranges for both the MAE and RMSE as acceptable values depend
on the underlying context (Willmott and Matsuura, 2005) but in general low values close to the
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theoretical minimum of zero are considered to be good Chaplot et al. (2000). We can use both the
MAE and RMSE to give a sense of the interpretabilitiy and the relation of both accuracy metrics
regarding the predicted and the actual values. Consider the following exemplary time series of390
vulnerabilities by assuming y the actual published and yˆ the predicted vulnerabilities in the time
frame {t = 1 . . . 6}:
Table 2: Example of Actual Published and Predicted Vulnerabilities.
t t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6
y 0 0 1 0 5 0
yˆ 0 0 0 2 5 0
A closer look at the predicted values in this examples reveals that only in t = 3 and t = 4 we
have a slight mismatch between the actual and the predicted values with one being underestimated
(y3 = 1 and yˆ3 = 0) and an overestimation in t4 with y4 = 0 and yˆ4 = 2. So, all in all, the forecasted395
values are good which is reflected in the value of MAE and RMSE. The computation shows that
MAE is rather low with 0.5 and is close to its theoretical minimum. The RMSE is 0.83 is very low
as well and close to its theoretical minimum. In this example, the mean of of the actual published
vulnerabilities is 0.5 and the mean of the predicted vulnerabilities is 1.16: Comparing the means
with the MAE and RMSE values, it shows that there is a good fit of the predicted vulnerabilities.400
We can state that a low mean of actual published vulnerabilities over a wide time frame (e.g., 5
years) indicates that the time series contains a lot of zero values. Using MAE and RMSE assures
us to reflect upon the prediction accuracy in a meaningful manner. A low MAE and RMSE close to
the mean of the actual vulnerabilities shows that there is a good fit of the prediction method. On
the other hand, a high MAE and RMSE which means that they are greater than the mean of the405
actual vulnerabilities, indicates that the deviation of the predicted vulnerabilities is high and the
prediction accuracy rather poor.
3.3. Dataset: National Vulnerability Database
We select a dataset from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)4, which provides a com-
prehensive list of unique vulnerability and exposure data and maps it to corresponding system or410
software package (Martin, 2001). The NVD is a freely available US government data source main-
tained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Since its launch in 1997,
it has reported standardized information about almost 80,000 software vulnerabilities. Although
there do exist other security vulnerability databases, which are often community projects, such as
4The NVD-XML-Files are available at https://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm.
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Table 3: Description of the Software and System Package
Application Domain Software / System Package Release Date Open Source
Browser Mozilla Firefox 2002 Yes
Browser Google Chrome 2008 Partially
Browser Internet Explorer 1995 No
Browser Safari 2003 No
Office Microsoft Office 1990 No
Office Thunderbird 2004 Yes
OS Mac OS X 2001 No
OS Ubuntu 2004 Yes
OS Microsoft Windows 1985 No
Vulners (www.vulners.com), The Exploit Database (www.exploit-db.com), or Packet Storm’s Vul-415
nerability Database (www.packetstormsecurity.com), the NVD database still remains widely used
and the most exhaustive resource for security vulnerability data. The dataset has been shown to be
particularly useful for “understanding trends and patterns in software vulnerabilities, so that one can
better manage the security of computer systems that are pestered by the ubiquitous software security
flaws” (Zhang et al., 2011).420
Table 3 shows a description of the application domains and corresponding software and system
packages covered in our analysis.
Within these application domains, we analyze a balanced mix of closed source and open source
software packages comprising the most prevalent software solutions in terms of market share. Our
dataset covers the time period from January 2002 to June 2016. We further distinguish the system425
and software packages along their major version releases, since a package’s version can serve as a
reliable predictor for its vulnerability discovery rate (Alhazmi et al., 2005). We use the version
numbers provided by the NVD database for each security vulnerability and group them by their
major releases. Since the objective of our paper is to forecast recently appearing security vulner-
abilities we focus on the root version of the software product where the vulnerability appeared430
first. Some vulnerabilities remain unpatched over multiple software versions and are therefore listed
under multiple versions in the NVD dataset. Despite the fact that this total number, as reported
on the NVD website, accurately reflects the number of vulnerabilities present in a specific software
product and version, we filter for the number of uniquely originating vulnerabilities. Although this
approach results in different sample sizes, we avoid aggregating multiple versions of a particular435
package to account for the individual vulnerability characteristics of each major version 5. Finally,
5An exception to this are the Firefox versions starting from version 7 and Thunderbird versions since the versioning
20
the vulnerabilities were aggregated per month to generate an adequate dataset for our analysis.
4. Empirical Results and Discussion
We predicted the number of IT security vulnerabilities based on the forecasting methodologies
implemented in the R package “forecast” (Hyndman, 2017). Figures 3 to 8 present the prediction440
accuracy (MAE) for nine software and system packages subdivided into the major versions for the
forecasting horizon of three months 6.
4.1. Results
Since there is no substantial difference in forecasting accuracy between forecasting horizons of one
or two months, we focus on the results of the longest forecasting horizon and provide complementary445
results for the other two time horizons in the appendix. Throughout the paper, forecasting accuracy
(MAE and RMSE) is reported for the whole time frame available (cf. Appendix D) and three
month forecasting horizons, unless stated otherwise. We show the performance of all six forecasting
methods and compare different versions of the system and software packages. Figure 2 plots the
time series and forecasts for Internet Explorer (Version 6) for the different forecasting methodologies450
as a representative example 7. The figures display the characteristics of the time series with regards
to its volatility and many zero values (rareness of occurrence). The plots furthermore show that
depending on the forecasting methodology, the difference between the predicted values and the
actual values varies considerably. While SES and Croston’s method produce smooth predictions
with low variability, the other methods rapidly adapt to variations of the time series which has455
impacts on the prediction accuracy.
of these products does not reflect major changes in steps from one version to another. We labeled these as ”rolling
versions”.
6Note that the time frame of ”three months” (h=3) means that vulnerabilities were summed up quarterly. The
prediction pertains to the next quarter.
7As we have a total of 270 different software and system packages and versions, we only provide one representative
example here. The other plots can be obtained from the authors.
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Figure 2: Time Series and Forecasts for Internet Explorer (v6)
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The Figures 3 to 8 show the forecasting accuracy in terms of MAE and RMSE. We observe that
the forecasting accuracy varies depending on the forecasting methodology.
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Figure 3: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=3 (months)
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Figure 4: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=3 (months)
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Figure 5: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=3 (months)
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Figure 6: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=3 (months)
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Figure 7: MAE for Office Solutions, h=3 (months)
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Figure 8: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, h=3 (months)
4.2. Discussion
We focus our discussion on how the accuracy of the forecasting methods is affected by the460
software and system packages and we consider the robustness of our results with regard to different
error metrics. Our discussion thereby contributes to the rising stream of literature analyzing IT
security vulnerabilities from a time series perspective and it examines how the prediction accuracy
of IT security vulnerabilities’ time series is impacted by the applied forecasting methodology.
4.2.1. Prediction Accuracy Depending on Software and System Packages465
With the variety of software and systems covered in our study, we have to examine how robust
our results are regarding different packages. We make a few observations: First, there is a tendency,
especially for the software package ”browsers”, that the forecasting methodology SES and Neural
Network are less suitable (cf. Fig. 5 and Fig. A.9 and A.12). In the case of Neural Networks, this
tendency applies to all packages. The reason for the poor results of SES and Neural Networks lies470
in the properties of security vulnerability time series data, rareness of occurrence and a tendency
towards outliers. Both characteristics have an impact on the effectiveness of the applied forecast-
ing methodology. In the intermittent demand literature, this phenomenon is widely known. The
infrequent demand arrivals coupled with variable demand sizes whenever demand occurs render the
problem of accurately estimating the demand especially challenging (Petropoulos and Kourentzes,475
2015). Translating this to our context, this means that the sudden appearance of vulnerabilities for
a few periods results in an overestimation of vulnerabilities in the following periods of time, i.e.,
vulnerabilities are predicted even if there were none. This explains the poor performance of these
two methods.
Second, from an intra-related observation between the different packages, it is evident that for480
some methods, the prediction accuracy varies considerably. For example, within browsers, DES
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together with SES and Neural Networks have achieved significantly poorer prediction accuracies for
Mac OS X (cf. Fig. 5) or TES with SES and Neural Networks for some versions of Google Chrome
(cf. Fig. 6). In general, we observe that the accuracy of the forecasting methodologies depends on
the applied software and system packages, and we note that approximately more or less the same485
prediction accuracy being close to its theoretical minimum for both metrics, except for SES and
Neural Networks (cf. Fig. 3 to Fig. 8 and Fig. A.9 to Fig. A.14). These observations have two
implications: (1) We can state that the choice of a forecasting methodology depends on the software
or system package as some methods are not suitable such as SES and Neural Networks, and (2)
from a managerial point of view, the tendency of low prediction errors offers decision-makers a good490
choice to use these forecasting methodologies in order to anticipate the development of IT security
vulnerabilities of their software and system applications in their organization’s portfolio.
4.2.2. Robustness of Different Measures of Prediction Accuracy
Another issue deserving attention is the robustness of our results in terms of the used forecasting-
error metrics MAE and RMSE. For instance, our discussion in the prior subsection revealed the poor495
performance of SES and Neural Networks. The crucial question is how to interpret these values and
the robustness of the prediction accuracy within the two applied forecasting-error metrics.
We can observe that the poor performance of SES and Neural Networks is independent from the
applied metrics MAE and RMSE - both metrics show the same tendency. For most of the cases,
in the light of our discussion in the prior subsection, we observe that the values of MAE are close500
to zero meaning that the prediction accuracy was high. As RMSE is more sensitive to outliers (cf.
Subsection 3.2.2), its values are higher but the overall tendency for the forecasting methodologies is
the same: The actual absolute prediction accuracy for MAE as well as for RMSE was low in most of
the cases (cf. Tables C.4 to C.6) with the exceptions of SES and Neural Networks for browsers. The
tendency of the other methodologies shows that the forecasting methodologies’ decomposition of505
the zero valued intervals is sufficient to capture the high volatility. Important implications from this
result are that that the prediction error is independent from the applied metrics and the prediction
accuracy was good for the forecasting methodologies despite dealing with time series that contain
many zero values. This is backed up by Table D.7 in which the actual vulnerabilities within the
time frame and the monthly averages are shown. Regarding the latter implication, a closer look510
to Safari v1 reveals that within the time of 13 years, 20 vulnerabilities occurred implying that this
time series contains a lot of zero values and, if vulnerabilities appear, they are volatile.
Regarding the robustness of our results, we observe a same tendency for both forecasting error
metrics which suggests that the outcome of the accuracy of a particular forecasting methodology is
independent from the choice of the metric. There are only slight differences in the metrics: Using515
MAE, we get values closer to zero for almost every forecasting methodology which means it is
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less sensitive to extreme values than RMSE. While RMSE estimation is based on the mean and is
more sensitive to extreme cases and outliers, the MAE estimation is based on the median and is
therefore more robust to outliers. In some cases using SES, we observe that RMSE dropped but
MAE increased. This means that these metrics are better at accounting for extreme cases, but the520
solution is less robust. However, Tables 3 to 8 show only slight variations between MAE and RMSE
for the different forecasting methods. When the MAE and RMSE are close to each other, it means
that very large errors are unlikely to have occurred.
To conclude, we can derive the implications that (1) the metrics MAE and RMSE can measure the
actual prediction error accurately in the context of IT security vulnerabilities and (2) the accuracy525
results of the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from the applied
metrics.
5. Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of forecasting the number of IT security vulnerabilities of
different system and software packages including operating systems, browsers and office solutions.530
The analysis of vulnerabilities with time series methods is a rising stream in the literature to
which our study contributes an extensive analysis of forecasting methodologies. We review the
pros and cons of forecasting error metrics and demonstrate the appropriateness of the absolute
error forecasting metric. Using the metrics MAE and RMSE, we discussed the forecasting accuracy
based on the robustness factors software and system packages and highlight the independence of the535
accuracy results from the metrics.
Our study reveals important implications: First, the selection of a forecasting methodology
depends on the software or system package as some methods show poor performances (such as
SES and Neural Networks). Second, our results are relevant to managerial decision makers as they
demonstrate the accuracy of IT security vulnerability forecasts, which can inform critical decisions540
on organizational software portfolios. Third, we were able to show that absolute metrics overcome
disadvantages of other, e.g., percentage-error metrics and that absolute metrics can cover the actual
prediction error precisely in the context of IT security vulnerabilities. Fourth, we could show that
the accuracy results of the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from
using absolute metrics.545
Our study has a few limitations: Although we followed a structured and accurate search process
to identify IT security vulnerabilities from the most extensive database NVD and linked the vul-
nerabilities uniquely to the corresponding root software and system package, we may have missed
vulnerabilities or missed vulnerabilities which are not included in the NVD database. Further, we
could only plot the time series and forecasts for Internet Explorer (Version 6) for the different fore-550
casting methodologies as a representative example as we have a total of 270 different software and
28
system packages and versions.
To conclude, we hope that our study encourages academics to develop suitable forecasting meth-
ods for IT security vulnerabilities which subsequently improve prediction accuracy.
555
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Appendix A. MAE Results for 1 and 2 Months560
Appendix A.1. MAE Results for 1 Month
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Figure A.9: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=1 (month)
Microsoft Office Thunderbird
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Figure A.10: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, h=1 (month)
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Figure A.11: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)
Appendix A.2. MAE Results for 2 Months
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Figure A.12: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)
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Microsoft Office Thunderbird
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Figure A.13: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, h=2 (months)
Windows Ubuntu Mac OS X
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Figure A.14: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=2 (months)
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Appendix B. RMSE Results for 1 and 2 Months
Appendix B.1. RMSE Results for 1 Month
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Figure B.15: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=1 (month)
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Figure B.16: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, h=1 (month)
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Windows Ubuntu Mac OS X
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Figure B.17: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)
Appendix B.2. RMSE Results for 2 Months565
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Figure B.18: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)
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Microsoft Office Thunderbird
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Figure B.19: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, h=2 (months)
Windows Ubuntu Mac OS X
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Figure B.20: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=2 (months)
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Appendix C. Parameters for Methods and Software / System Packages
Appendix C.1. Forecasting Results for Methods and Software / System Packages (Mean Absolute
Error / Root Mean Squared Error)
36
Table C.4: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 1
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.92 / 1.27) (0.75 / 1.28) (0.73 / 1.23) (0.72 / 1.2) (0.63 / 1.14) (1.35 / 1.54)
v1 (1.66 / 1.7) (1.05 / 1.79) (0.96 / 1.62) (1.01 / 1.68) (0.91 / 1.65) (3.61 / 4.1)
v2 (0.72 / 1.12) (0.69 / 1.19) (0.62 / 1.04) (0.61 / 1.02) (0.56 / 1.02) (1.56 / 1.77)
v3 (0.93 / 1.27) (1.95 / 3.34) (0.7 / 1.17) (0.74 / 1.23) (0.64 / 1.16) (1.64 / 1.86)
v7 (15.81 / 5.25) (3.2 / 5.47) (2.87 / 4.83) (2.98 / 4.98) (2.39 / 4.33) (9.37 / 10.64)
v8 rolling (14.86 / 5.09) (3.43 / 5.88) (2.62 / 4.4) (2.95 / 4.92) (2.81 / 5.1) (4.91 / 5.57)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.58 / 0.94) (0.75 / 1) (0.75 / 0.88) (0.82 / 0.94) (0.62 / 0.95) (1.15 / 1.78)
v2 (32.52 / 7.01) (5.63 / 7.49) (5.6 / 6.56) (6.05 / 6.91) (3.97 / 6.09) (7.3 / 11.25)
v3 (37.48 / 7.53) (5.77 / 7.67) (5.75 / 6.73) (6.56 / 7.49) (5.33 / 8.18) (8.75 / 13.5)
v4 (61.42 / 9.63) (7.01 / 9.32) (12.53 / 14.66) (7.2 / 8.22) (5.08 / 7.8) (10.24 / 15.79)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.7 / 0.79) (0.78 / 1.1) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.63 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.75) (1.6 / 2.13)
v6 (0.7 / 2.64) (1.89 / 2.66) (1.78 / 2.5) (1.77 / 2.46) (1.99 / 2.92) (2.35 / 3.14)
v7 (0.7 / 0.65) (0.48 / 0.68) (0.45 / 0.63) (0.47 / 0.66) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.67 / 0.89)
v8 (0.7 / 1.68) (1.25 / 1.76) (1.06 / 1.49) (1.11 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.65) (1.57 / 2.1)
v9 (0.7 / 4.07) (2.91 / 4.11) (2.35 / 3.29) (2.94 / 4.08) (2.63 / 3.86) (3.51 / 4.69)
v10 (0.7 / 3.19) (2.05 / 2.89) (1.99 / 2.79) (1.7 / 2.35) (2.29 / 3.37) (2.48 / 3.31)
v11 (0.7 / 4.84) (3.81 / 5.37) (3.33 / 4.66) (3.25 / 4.5) (2.86 / 4.21) (4.9 / 6.55)
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Table C.4: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 1
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.65) (0.63 / 1.67) (0.75 / 1.61) (0.77 / 1.64) (0.4 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.78)
v2 (0.25 / 0.81) (0.32 / 0.84) (0.36 / 0.77) (0.38 / 0.8) (0.2 / 0.79) (0.92 / 1.46)
v3 (0.31 / 1) (2.49 / 6.63) (0.44 / 0.94) (0.47 / 1) (0.23 / 0.88) (0.89 / 1.4)
v4 (0.4 / 1.31) (0.59 / 1.57) (0.59 / 1.28) (0.58 / 1.24) (0.28 / 1.09) (1.27 / 2.01)
v5 (0.79 / 2.6) (2.17 / 5.77) (1.07 / 2.32) (0.82 / 1.75) (0.59 / 2.32) (2.34 / 3.7)
v6 (0.65 / 2.12) (0.87 / 2.32) (0.86 / 1.85) (0.96 / 2.04) (0.46 / 1.8) (1.83 / 2.9)
v8 (1.48 / 4.84) (1.92 / 5.11) (2.02 / 4.36) (2.21 / 4.72) (1.18 / 4.58) (10.11 / 16.01)
v9 (0.54 / 1.75) (0.85 / 2.26) (0.77 / 1.66) (0.77 / 1.64) (0.41 / 1.59) (1.21 / 1.91)
v10 (5.04 / 16.5) (6.71 / 17.85) (4.01 / 8.66) (7.3 / 15.56) (3.7 / 14.4) (14.1 / 22.34)
v11 (7.63 / 24.98) (33.42 / 88.88) (9.41 / 20.32) (10.54 / 22.49) (5.37 / 20.93) (11.66 / 18.47)
Microsoft Office Versions
Office 2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.31 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.41) (0.5 / 0.67)
Office 2003 (1.25 / 1.78) (1.28 / 1.8) (1.24 / 1.74) (1.26 / 1.75) (1 / 1.48) (1.62 / 2.16)
Office 2010 (0.57 / 0.81) (0.57 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.72) (0.59 / 0.81) (0.53 / 0.79) (0.75 / 1)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.4) (0.34 / 0.89) (0.18 / 0.38) (0.18 / 0.39) (0.09 / 0.35) (0.33 / 0.53)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.24 / 0.65) (0.26 / 0.57) (0.29 / 0.61) (0.17 / 0.66) (0.76 / 1.2)
v3 (21.19 / 8.33) (3.22 / 8.56) (3.51 / 7.59) (3.87 / 8.25) (1.86 / 7.24) (9.73 / 15.41)
v4 (8.6 / 5.31) (2.32 / 6.18) (2.2 / 4.74) (2.31 / 4.93) (1.23 / 4.79) (10.48 / 16.6)
v6 (1.91 / 2.5) (1.01 / 2.68) (1.04 / 2.25) (1.14 / 2.43) (0.74 / 2.89) (2.68 / 4.25)
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Table C.4: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 1
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
v7 (8.15 / 5.17) (2.1 / 5.58) (2.46 / 5.32) (2.31 / 4.92) (1.06 / 4.15) (4.8 / 7.61)
v8 (44.23 / 12.04) (4.76 / 12.66) (1.22 / 2.63) (4.78 / 10.2) (2.55 / 9.93) (7.78 / 12.32)
v9 (4.91 / 4.01) (1.64 / 4.36) (1.46 / 3.16) (2.04 / 4.36) (0.87 / 3.39) (2.23 / 3.53)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.43) (1.18 / 2.03) (0.8 / 1.34) (0.84 / 1.4) (0.78 / 1.42) (2.91 / 3.3)
Ubuntu Versions
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.67) (0.41 / 0.71) (0.37 / 0.62) (0.38 / 0.64) (0.35 / 0.63) (0.89 / 1.02)
v12.04 (1.76 / 3.08) (2.31 / 3.96) (1.66 / 2.78) (1.82 / 3.03) (1.58 / 2.87) (3.66 / 4.16)
v14.04 (1.07 / 1.86) (3.99 / 6.84) (1.37 / 2.3) (1.14 / 1.91) (1.02 / 1.84) (2.46 / 2.79)
Windows Versions
Windows XP (1.09 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.59) (1.04 / 1.45) (1.08 / 1.52) (0.99 / 1.45) (1.56 / 2.08)
Windows Vista (0.44 / 0.62) (0.48 / 0.68) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.43 / 0.6) (0.39 / 0.57) (0.62 / 0.83)
Windows 7 (0.85 / 1.21) (3.6 / 5.08) (0.75 / 1.05) (0.81 / 1.12) (0.76 / 1.12) (1.45 / 1.94)
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Table C.5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 2
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.95 / 1.29) (0.76 / 1.3) (0.74 / 1.25) (0.72 / 1.21) (0.64 / 1.16) (1.35 / 1.52)
v1 (1.65 / 1.7) (1.04 / 1.79) (0.96 / 1.62) (1.02 / 1.69) (0.91 / 1.66) (3.56 / 4.02)
v2 (0.72 / 1.13) (0.7 / 1.21) (0.61 / 1.04) (0.62 / 1.02) (0.57 / 1.04) (1.59 / 1.79)
v3 (0.95 / 1.29) (2.09 / 3.6) (0.69 / 1.18) (0.75 / 1.25) (0.67 / 1.22) (1.64 / 1.85)
v7 (16.79 / 5.42) (3.33 / 5.73) (2.92 / 4.94) (3.06 / 5.09) (2.5 / 4.55) (8.98 / 10.13)
v8 rolling (15.15 / 5.15) (3.54 / 6.09) (2.6 / 4.4) (2.98 / 4.95) (2.73 / 4.96) (5.51 / 6.21)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.6 / 0.95) (0.77 / 1.02) (0.78 / 0.89) (0.84 / 0.95) (0.6 / 0.93) (1.32 / 1.71)
v2 (36.55 / 7.45) (6.3 / 8.29) (6.14 / 7.02) (6.48 / 7.35) (4.06 / 6.27) (9.53 / 12.34)
v3 (38.57 / 7.65) (5.93 / 7.81) (5.96 / 6.82) (6.7 / 7.61) (5.18 / 8.01) (10.55 / 13.65)
v4 (61.7 / 9.68) (6.92 / 9.12) (15.83 / 18.1) (7.41 / 8.42) (5.29 / 8.17) (10.67 / 13.81)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.71 / 0.79) (0.84 / 1.17) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.64 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.76) (1.58 / 2.14)
v6 (0.71 / 2.68) (1.93 / 2.71) (1.83 / 2.55) (1.84 / 2.54) (2.07 / 3.06) (2.61 / 3.53)
v7 (0.71 / 0.66) (0.49 / 0.69) (0.46 / 0.64) (0.48 / 0.66) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.63 / 0.85)
v8 (0.71 / 1.66) (1.24 / 1.74) (1.05 / 1.46) (1.13 / 1.56) (1.11 / 1.65) (1.53 / 2.08)
v9 (0.71 / 4.12) (2.96 / 4.15) (2.4 / 3.34) (3 / 4.14) (2.87 / 4.26) (3.48 / 4.71)
v10 (0.71 / 2.45) (1.68 / 2.36) (1.66 / 2.31) (1.58 / 2.18) (1.68 / 2.48) (1.86 / 2.52)
v11 (0.71 / 4.96) (3.98 / 5.58) (3.38 / 4.7) (3.27 / 4.51) (3.11 / 4.62) (4.87 / 6.6)
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Table C.5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 2
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.65) (0.65 / 1.68) (0.79 / 1.61) (0.83 / 1.64) (0.4 / 1.57) (0.98 / 1.76)
v2 (0.25 / 0.81) (0.32 / 0.84) (0.38 / 0.77) (0.4 / 0.8) (0.21 / 0.81) (0.77 / 1.39)
v3 (0.3 / 1) (2.75 / 7.14) (0.46 / 0.94) (0.51 / 1.01) (0.24 / 0.94) (0.77 / 1.38)
v4 (0.4 / 1.33) (0.64 / 1.66) (0.63 / 1.29) (0.62 / 1.24) (0.31 / 1.19) (1.05 / 1.88)
v5 (0.78 / 2.57) (2.43 / 6.29) (1.13 / 2.32) (0.89 / 1.77) (0.64 / 2.48) (1.76 / 3.16)
v6 (0.65 / 2.13) (0.91 / 2.36) (0.91 / 1.86) (1.03 / 2.05) (0.48 / 1.85) (1.44 / 2.59)
v8 (1.49 / 4.9) (2 / 5.2) (2.14 / 4.39) (2.4 / 4.77) (1.2 / 4.68) (8.47 / 15.19)
v9 (0.53 / 1.74) (0.87 / 2.27) (0.82 / 1.68) (0.84 / 1.66) (0.4 / 1.57) (1.27 / 2.28)
v10 (5.25 / 17.24) (7.38 / 19.14) (4.35 / 8.9) (8.05 / 15.97) (3.83 / 14.91) (11.63 / 20.85)
v11 (6.11 / 20.08) (35.57 / 92.3) (9.08 / 18.6) (9.99 / 19.83) (4.89 / 19.03) (12.18 / 21.85)
Microsoft Office Versions
Office 2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.31 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.42) (0.53 / 0.72)
Office 2003 (1.27 / 1.79) (1.29 / 1.82) (1.26 / 1.75) (1.27 / 1.76) (1.08 / 1.61) (1.64 / 2.23)
Office 2010 (0.58 / 0.82) (0.58 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.59 / 0.82) (0.56 / 0.83) (0.75 / 1.01)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.41) (0.38 / 0.99) (0.19 / 0.39) (0.2 / 0.39) (0.1 / 0.37) (0.3 / 0.54)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.25 / 0.64) (0.28 / 0.57) (0.31 / 0.61) (0.18 / 0.69) (0.59 / 1.06)
v3 (21.31 / 8.37) (3.31 / 8.59) (3.72 / 7.62) (4.18 / 8.29) (2.05 / 7.95) (9.22 / 16.54)
v4 (8.98 / 5.43) (2.53 / 6.56) (2.33 / 4.77) (2.59 / 5.14) (1.29 / 5.01) (8.12 / 14.57)
v6 (1.94 / 2.52) (1.04 / 2.7) (1.1 / 2.26) (1.24 / 2.46) (0.8 / 3.1) (2.41 / 4.32)
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Table C.5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 2
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
v7 (8.57 / 5.3) (2.22 / 5.76) (2.55 / 5.22) (2.52 / 4.99) (1.2 / 4.68) (5.21 / 9.34)
v8 (49.8 / 12.79) (6.07 / 15.76) (1.29 / 2.65) (5.89 / 11.68) (2.89 / 11.23) (10.05 / 18.03)
v9 (4.5 / 3.85) (1.63 / 4.22) (1.58 / 3.25) (2.13 / 4.22) (0.85 / 3.31) (2.86 / 5.12)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.43) (1.22 / 2.09) (0.79 / 1.34) (0.84 / 1.4) (0.79 / 1.43) (2.78 / 3.13)
Ubuntu Versions
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.68) (0.42 / 0.73) (0.38 / 0.64) (0.39 / 0.65) (0.38 / 0.69) (0.87 / 0.98)
v12.04 (1.77 / 3.1) (2.39 / 4.1) (1.63 / 2.76) (1.84 / 3.06) (1.6 / 2.9) (3.79 / 4.27)
v14.04 (1.17 / 2.04) (4.78 / 8.22) (1.37 / 2.33) (1.24 / 2.07) (1.07 / 1.95) (2.16 / 2.44)
Windows Versions
Windows XP (1.1 / 1.55) (1.14 / 1.59) (1.05 / 1.46) (1.1 / 1.54) (1.03 / 1.52) (1.52 / 2.06)
Windows Vista (0.44 / 0.62) (0.51 / 0.71) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.44 / 0.61) (0.41 / 0.6) (0.62 / 0.85)
Windows 7 (0.86 / 1.22) (4.04 / 5.67) (0.76 / 1.06) (0.82 / 1.13) (0.76 / 1.13) (1.4 / 1.9)
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Table C.6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 3
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.99 / 1.32) (0.78 / 1.34) (0.76 / 1.28) (0.73 / 1.22) (0.65 / 1.18) (1.36 / 1.6)
v1 (1.67 / 1.71) (1.05 / 1.81) (0.97 / 1.63) (1.02 / 1.7) (0.91 / 1.66) (3.33 / 3.91)
v2 (0.72 / 1.12) (0.7 / 1.21) (0.62 / 1.04) (0.61 / 1.03) (0.57 / 1.04) (1.41 / 1.65)
v3 (0.95 / 1.29) (2.25 / 3.87) (0.7 / 1.18) (0.75 / 1.26) (0.69 / 1.25) (1.65 / 1.94)
v7 (17.6 / 5.56) (3.55 / 6.1) (3.02 / 5.08) (3.15 / 5.27) (2.65 / 4.83) (8.46 / 9.94)
v8 rolling (15.33 / 5.19) (3.65 / 6.27) (2.64 / 4.43) (2.97 / 4.98) (2.75 / 5.01) (5.32 / 6.25)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.62 / 0.97) (0.79 / 1.06) (0.77 / 0.91) (0.83 / 0.97) (0.62 / 0.96) (1.39 / 1.76)
v2 (38.37 / 7.63) (6.71 / 8.97) (6.2 / 7.3) (6.46 / 7.58) (4.14 / 6.36) (9.68 / 12.3)
v3 (40.03 / 7.79) (5.95 / 7.94) (5.86 / 6.89) (6.6 / 7.74) (5.43 / 8.34) (10.94 / 13.9)
v4 (55.13 / 9.14) (6.66 / 8.9) (20.05 / 23.58) (7.2 / 8.45) (5.15 / 7.91) (11.05 / 14.04)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.71 / 0.79) (0.89 / 1.25) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.64 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.76) (1.98 / 2.6)
v6 (0.71 / 2.71) (1.95 / 2.74) (1.84 / 2.57) (1.86 / 2.58) (2.06 / 3.06) (2.75 / 3.6)
v7 (0.71 / 0.66) (0.49 / 0.69) (0.46 / 0.64) (0.48 / 0.67) (0.42 / 0.62) (0.69 / 0.9)
v8 (0.71 / 1.68) (1.27 / 1.78) (1.07 / 1.49) (1.15 / 1.6) (1.13 / 1.68) (1.67 / 2.19)
v9 (0.71 / 4.14) (2.97 / 4.18) (2.41 / 3.37) (3.01 / 4.18) (2.93 / 4.36) (3.68 / 4.82)
v10 (0.71 / 2.21) (1.63 / 2.29) (1.62 / 2.26) (1.6 / 2.22) (1.41 / 2.1) (1.9 / 2.49)
v11 (0.71 / 5.09) (4.21 / 5.9) (3.43 / 4.78) (3.29 / 4.56) (3.16 / 4.7) (4.76 / 6.24)
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Table C.6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 3
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.66) (0.66 / 1.68) (0.81 / 1.61) (0.83 / 1.65) (0.41 / 1.59) (0.92 / 1.75)
v2 (0.25 / 0.82) (0.33 / 0.85) (0.39 / 0.77) (0.4 / 0.8) (0.21 / 0.82) (0.71 / 1.36)
v3 (0.3 / 1) (2.96 / 7.59) (0.47 / 0.94) (0.51 / 1) (0.25 / 0.96) (0.72 / 1.38)
v4 (0.4 / 1.32) (0.68 / 1.75) (0.64 / 1.28) (0.62 / 1.24) (0.32 / 1.23) (1.02 / 1.95)
v5 (0.77 / 2.52) (2.68 / 6.87) (1.16 / 2.32) (0.9 / 1.79) (0.63 / 2.43) (1.55 / 2.96)
v6 (0.65 / 2.15) (0.94 / 2.4) (0.94 / 1.87) (1.04 / 2.06) (0.49 / 1.89) (1.4 / 2.67)
v8 (1.5 / 4.95) (2.06 / 5.27) (2.23 / 4.44) (2.42 / 4.81) (1.23 / 4.76) (7.74 / 14.74)
v9 (0.52 / 1.7) (0.97 / 2.5) (0.86 / 1.71) (0.83 / 1.65) (0.39 / 1.52) (1.18 / 2.24)
v10 (5.42 / 17.82) (7.91 / 20.26) (4.41 / 8.78) (8.25 / 16.4) (3.96 / 15.35) (11.39 / 21.7)
v11 (6.63 / 21.8) (35.66 / 91.34) (9.07 / 18.08) (9.73 / 19.36) (4.96 / 19.22) (12.82 / 24.43)
Microsoft Office Versions
Office 2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.32 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.42) (0.55 / 0.72)
Office 2003 (1.28 / 1.81) (1.31 / 1.84) (1.27 / 1.77) (1.28 / 1.77) (1.13 / 1.68) (1.75 / 2.29)
Office 2010 (0.58 / 0.82) (0.58 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.59 / 0.82) (0.56 / 0.83) (0.75 / 0.98)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.41) (0.43 / 1.11) (0.2 / 0.39) (0.2 / 0.4) (0.1 / 0.37) (0.28 / 0.53)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.25 / 0.65) (0.29 / 0.57) (0.31 / 0.61) (0.18 / 0.71) (0.53 / 1.01)
v3 (21.47 / 8.41) (3.37 / 8.63) (3.84 / 7.66) (4.19 / 8.33) (2.1 / 8.14) (8.34 / 15.89)
v4 (9.17 / 5.49) (2.65 / 6.8) (2.41 / 4.8) (2.63 / 5.23) (1.31 / 5.08) (7.96 / 15.17)
v6 (1.98 / 2.55) (1.07 / 2.73) (1.13 / 2.25) (1.25 / 2.49) (0.84 / 3.24) (2.16 / 4.13)
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Table C.6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methods and Software / System Packages over a 3
Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston Nnet
v7 (8.9 / 5.41) (2.35 / 6.02) (2.63 / 5.24) (2.55 / 5.06) (1.23 / 4.77) (5.06 / 9.65)
v8 (53.76 / 13.3) (6.87 / 17.61) (1.32 / 2.64) (6.25 / 12.44) (2.99 / 11.61) (10.55 / 20.11)
v9 (5.75 / 4.35) (1.75 / 4.49) (1.72 / 3.42) (2.26 / 4.49) (0.86 / 3.33) (2.32 / 4.42)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.44) (1.27 / 2.18) (0.81 / 1.35) (0.85 / 1.42) (0.8 / 1.46) (2.57 / 3.02)
Ubuntu Versions
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.69) (0.43 / 0.74) (0.4 / 0.66) (0.39 / 0.66) (0.4 / 0.73) (0.86 / 1.01)
v12.04 (1.79 / 3.14) (2.47 / 4.24) (1.64 / 2.76) (1.84 / 3.08) (1.63 / 2.97) (3.69 / 4.34)
v14.04 (0.97 / 1.7) (5.61 / 9.63) (1.3 / 2.18) (1.09 / 1.83) (0.88 / 1.6) (1.8 / 2.11)
Windows Versions
Windows XP (1.1 / 1.56) (1.14 / 1.61) (1.05 / 1.47) (1.1 / 1.54) (1.05 / 1.56) (1.6 / 2.1)
Windows Vista (0.44 / 0.63) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.44 / 0.61) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.64 / 0.83)
Windows 7 (0.86 / 1.22) (4.47 / 6.28) (0.76 / 1.06) (0.82 / 1.14) (0.77 / 1.14) (1.47 / 1.93)
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Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics
Table D.7: Descriptive Statistics
Software / System Package Version Time Frame Vulnerabilities Monthly Average
Firefox v0 01/08/04 - 01/06/16 74 0.52
v1 01/12/04 - 01/06/16 119 0.86
v2 01/08/05 - 01/06/16 61 0.47
v3 01/12/06 - 01/06/16 117 1.026
v7 01/11/11 - 01/06/16 110 2
v8 rolling 01/12/11 - 01/06/16 196 3.63
Google Chrome v1 01/09/08 - 01/06/16 86 0.92
v2 01/05/10 - 01/06/16 458 6.27
v3 01/05/11 - 01/06/16 499 8.18
v4 01/04/15 - 01/06/16 168 12
Internet Explorer v5 01/03/99 - 01/06/16 157 0.76
v6 01/04/98 - 01/06/16 373 1.71
v7 01/12/05 - 01/06/16 31 0.25
v8 01/05/08 - 01/06/16 99 1.02
v9 01/06/11 - 01/06/16 288 4.8
v10 01/03/13 - 01/06/16 77 1.97
v11 01/12/13 - 01/06/16 152 5.07
Mac OS X v0 01/07/01 - 01/06/16 174 4.83
v2 01/12/02 - 01/06/16 36 0.22
v3 01/11/03 - 01/06/16 53 0.35
v4 01/06/05 - 01/06/16 137 0.79
v5 01/11/07 - 01/06/16 130 1.26
v6 01/03/10 - 01/06/16 22 0.29
v8 01/03/13 - 01/06/16 82 2.10
v9 01/11/13 - 01/06/16 50 1.61
v10 01/11/14 - 01/06/16 51 0.25
v11 01/09/15 - 01/06/16 140 15.56
MS Office 2001 01/12/99 - 01/06/16 16 0.08
2003 01/03/06 - 01/06/16 136 1.11
2010 01/11/10 - 01/06/16 34 0.51
Safari v1 01/06/03 - 01/06/16 20 0.13
v2 01/07/05 - 01/06/16 20 0.15
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Table D.7: Descriptive Statistics
Software / System Package Version Time Frame Vulnerabilities Monthly Average
v3 01/06/07 - 01/06/16 214 1.98
v4 01/02/09 - 01/06/16 91 1.03
v6 01/06/13 - 01/06/16 27 0.75
v7 01/03/14 - 01/06/16 71 2.63
v8 01/11/14 - 01/06/16 78 4.11
v9 01/12/15 - 01/06/16 17 2.83
Thunderbird rolling 01/08/04 - 01/06/16 116 0.82
Ubuntu v11.04 01/09/08 - 01/06/16 17 0.18
v12.04 01/05/12 - 01/06/16 94 1.92
v14.04 01/05/14 - 01/06/16 54 2.16
Windows XP 01/11/01 - 01/06/16 166 0.95
Vista 01/02/07 - 01/06/16 40 0.36
7 01/06/07 - 01/06/16 105 0.97
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